Nyendo – Masaka, Buddu

Luganda (Original)

Mwana waffe Ssemujju, tufunye ensisisi okuwulira nti olanze mu butongole nti oli mu FDC era kati otambulira ku bilagiro bya Mukiga Omuhororo Kiiza Besigye ne mukyala we ‘katula kebise buka’ Omulaalo Winnie.  Wadde simanyi kusoma luzungu naye mbadde nenyumiririza nnyo mu bigambo by’owandiika kubanga babinkyusiza bulungi abavubuka. Ate on’omugu w’eddalu bweyali tanaba kusalako radio yaffe, nga sikusubwa ne madamu ticha Nambooze ku Kiriza oba gaana. Nze awamu ne mukyala wange ffena otulese bubi nnyo, kubanga tubadde tumanyi nti oli musajja mugezi nnyo era omanyi ebyafaayo bya Buganda. Era nga omanyi nti banamawanga bonna okuva ku bazungu ku Muteesa I okutuuka ku Museveni ku Mutebi II balwaana kumalawo Buganda. Oyo Omukiga namwe abakozesa bukozesa nga kondomu era olunamala nga asuula mu kyolooni. Olowooza bwebinatuuka ku nsonga enkulu ennyo ez’ebyaama bya FDC Besigye oba Winnie Byanyima banabyogerako nga waliwo omuzirango Ssemujju?

Ssebo mutabani, eriso ly’omukulu, awaddugala wewalaba. Kyenva nkusaba wekube mu kifuba ogende mpola ku banamawanga. Ye ddala enjawulo wakati wa Museveni ne Besigye egenda kuba etya? Olowoza ba Seguya, Abu Mayanja, Kisekka nabo si bwebeewa Museveni mbu kubanga yali aleeta enkyukakyuuka ez’omoggundu? Mutabani bazaamu, senga Besigye awangula nga bwolowooza, emirimu ggyonna egy’amaanyi anagiwa ani? Oba tomanyi, kankubireko nti Abakiga bajja kwongera ku kyebalya naye omulyo era gujja kusigala mu be bugwanjuba. Ku bya Buganda, agenda kwegaana endagaano zonna nga Museveni bwakola kati. Kubanga ssenga Abaganda tufuna Federo eya 1962 ne mailo 9,000 tuba tujja kuyitawo nnyo. Teli munamawanga mu Uganda, abe Mukiga, Mulango, Munyoro oba Musoga, ayinza kukikkiriza. Wadde Omuganda nga Haji Nasser Sebagala senga awangula, tagenda kukiriza.

Bulijjo ffe tumanyi nti omutima gwo gusibira ku bya Buganda na Ssabasajja. Mutabani kyaali kiwaani? Anti wadde ffembi tuli basilaamu naye tukimanyi nti okugenda okukuwoowa n’omukyala omulala nga gw’olina kati mulwadde tolina zimujanjaba, biba bya Ekanya. Kituluma okuba nti luli obadde n’omulamwa ogwa nabaddala era nga nebwogwaako ekizibu okuva mu ba NRM tumanya ensonga. Kati omulamwa ggwo gufuuse ki okujjako okutendereza Omukiga Besigye? Bwebanakuba ebiyiso, onotugamba nti babikkubira Bakiga na Balaalo?

Katusabe Mungu akuwe emirembe era bwekiba kisoboka akuzibule amaaso, otegeere nti ebintu bya Uganda bya ‘lubaale mubbe’. Bano abasajja, nga ne Besigye mw’omutwaalidde, ba luganda abajja okunyaga Buganda. Bwebayomba mbu FDC oba NRM, tewemalaayo nnyo kubanga ‘ab’oluganda bita, bwebikonagana tebyatika’.

Ssabasajja Awangaale.

Notes and English Translations By Buganda Post Writers

On October 29, 2009 Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda, one of the most prominent pro-Buganda journalists in Uganda announced that he had joined FDC. Prior to the announcement, Mr. Ssemujju was known to be relatively independent of Ugandan political parties although he showed sympathy for FDC and JEEMA and openly opposed the NRM. For details of  Ssemujju’s announcement see “SSEMUJJU NGANDA: Why I have joined FDC” or visit the Observer website at www.observer.ug.

English

Our son Ssemujju, we were shocked to hear that you officially announced that you are FDC and will now take your orders from the Muhororo Mukiga Kiiza Besigye his Mulaalo ‘katula kebisse buka’ (‘sweet looking bitter pill’) Winnie.  Although I don’t know who to read English, I have been very proud of what you write because the young people here translate well for me. And before the mad man closed our radio station, I would never miss listening to you on the “Kiriza Oba Gaana” (”Take It Or Leave It”) program. You have left both me and my wife in a very bad situation because we were confident that you are an intelligent man who knows the history of Buganda. And that you know that foreigner, from the time of the British with Muteesa I to Museveni with Mutebi, are always fighting to take Buganda off the map. That Mukiga will also use you like condoms and afterwards throw you away in trash. Do you really think that when it comes to discussing sensitive FDC matters Besigye or Winnie Byanyima will do it in the presence of a Ngo clan member Ssemujju?

Son, the dirty part of an elder’s eye is what sees. That is why I am begging you to rethink your decision and go slow with these foreigners. Really, what is the big difference you expect between Museveni and Besigye? Son, think about it, if Besigye wins as you believe, who is going to get all the important jobs? In case you don’t know, let me tell you that Bakiga will eat more but, overall, everything will stay with the westerners. On Buganda issues, he will simply deny having signed any agreements as Museveni has done. Because, if Baganda get the 1962 Federo plus the 9,000 square miles they may develop very fast. No foreigner in Uganda, whether Mukiga, Langi, Munyoro or Musoga would allow it. Even if a Muganda like Haji Nasser Ssebagala wins, he will not allow it.

All along, we were sure that your heart is with Buganda and Ssabasajja Kabaka. Son, were we misled? That is because, though both of us are Muslims, we know that running to marry a second wife when you have money problems and your first wife is sick, is ridiculous. It pains us that up to now you had a clear agenda so that even if the NRM people gave you problems, the reasons would be clear. Now, what is you agenda except to praise and promote Besigye? And if they inject you with funny chemicals, will it be for Bakiga and Balaalo?

We shall pray to God to give you peace and, if possible, to open your eyes so you can understand that Uganda politics is a case of ‘lubaale mubbe’ (”the bag is empty”). These people, including Besigye, are all of one family and they came to ransack Buganda. Even when the fight over FDC or NRM politics, don’t get too involved because  ‘ab’oluganda bita, bwebikonagana tebyatika’ (”brothers are like wine gourds, when they knock each other they never break.”)

Ssabasajja Awangaale.

The Boston [Buganda Emergency Meeting] Resolutions number 3,8 and 10 prove that Buganda’s greatest problem is we the Baganda ourselves. Up to now we have failed to understand our problem? It is deceptive for any patriotic Muganda or genuine Buganda well wisher to still prescribe federalism, free and fair elections, democracy, and mobilization of other ethnic communities as way forward for Buganda as envisaged in the Boston resolutions 3,8, and 10 (see “Resolutions of the Buganda Emergency Meeting in Boston on October 17, 2009“). The authors of the Boston resolutions should retreat and carefully study the Buganda problem right from the 1950s up to now 2009 and see whether their resolution score any goals for Buganda.

The truth is that Democracy’s free and fair elections wont solve our problem. There is overwhelming evidence that any thing that affects or pains Buganda automatically brings joy/ happiness to the rest of Uganda. Whoever inflicts pain on Buganda automatically gets the backing of the rest parts of Uganda. So what do you [expect] in terms of votes! Definitely the candidate who displays most anti- Bugandaism will get more votes because nothing really unites Ugandans more than their common hate for Buganda.

Buganda struggled and earned full federal in 1962 protected by the 1962 constitution. How did it help us? For how long did it last? How was it lost? What has changed now?

It is laziness to demand for federal now. Self-determination is our right. We have a right to exist the way we prefer. Lets focus on Buganda’s independence. We can re-unite with other Uganda if we find it necessary but on our own terms.          

Kyawedde dda! Ssabasajja  is cool with us radical Baganda.  Many of us are constantly accused of being “too radical” by fellow Baganda because we are not willing to compromise with NRM or anyone else who suggests that Uganda is more important than Buganda. Many Ugandans, including prominent Baganda both in Mmengo and outside have vilified us by calling us “tribalists”, “sectarian”, “unpatriotic”, “backward” or  ”too radical”. Even Kabaka’s representatives in Europe and America, serving their own personal interests, have made false reports to Mmengo and Kabaka about us. We have even been accused of being “anti Kabaka” and “anti Mengo” simply because we are not afraid of pointing out Buganda government officials who are in bed with the enemy.

Who are we? We are the millions of Baganda youths in Nkoba za Mbogo, Bana ba Kintu and other organizations, who pioneered the resistance against the marginalization of our Kabaka and our nation Buganda.  We are the Bazukulu ba Buganda, who a few corrupt Buganda government officials, cheating Kabaka, have harassed for years. We the radicals also include members of Ggwangamujje in Europe and America who have not been equivocal about putting Buganda and Kabaka first. We have organized Ttabamiruka conferences in America and Buganda, angering the NRM government, Uganda politicians and even some Buganda government officials. Oh, and we are also deep in Mmengo, fighting the NRM moles who betray our Kabaka and Buganda for a few pieces of silver. A few of us are even Baganda clan leaders, who would rather die poor than betray our Kabaka and our Bazukulu. Some of us radical have been kidnapped and molested, or otherwise harassed, but gone back to the our usual  behavior  of channels to telling the NRM dictators that we won’t quit!  It is us radicals who have also made the ultimate sacrifice for Buganda, getting shot dead by the NRM government’s police and soldiers.

The reason we are radical is simple. We whole heartedly embrace the saying, “Baganda nkoba za mbogo; zegya zoka mu bunya”.  And the plot to destroy Buganda, since 1990, is so thick that if we continue acting “nice and civilized” there might be no Buganda soon.  You will not hear us praising any Ugandan politician, Muganda or not, as the one will save Buganda;  because we know they cannot.  Nor do we get excited about promised from the NRM government because we do not accept the idea that anyone has a right to play “master” over Kabaka and Buganda.   All that talk about Federo is alright so long it is not “given” or “granted” to us. Only Baganda can and should determine how they are ruled, whether Federo or full independence. We do not owe Uganda  anything and cannot be forced to accept other people’s arrangements under duress, as it happened in 1960 and 1995.

We proudly claim that Ssabasajja  is now one of us radical Baganda because his historical actions in September 2009 leave no doubt that he has lost patience with the “Abasajja tubakwaate mpola” philosophy.  We are confident that he is tired of uncivilized, unkempt, Banamawanga telling him to shut up while they rape and pillage his kingdom. Look around him now and you see us, the radicals. We didn’t all start this way. So, it is OK if you are not yet a radical Muganda but we look forward to having you join us. It is such a liberating feeling!

I found the arrogance in Mr. Museveni’s “Guidance to Banyoro Bafuruki question” letter, posted in Buganda Post on August 1, 2009, unacceptable. Click on “Tired, Drowning Museveni Blames Baganda For Bunyoro Land Violence” to see the letter. I cannot understand how a man who became president on the backs of Baganda can go so far in abusing us and our Kabaka. I had to do something about it. My late father used to tell us that, if you want deal with a stone-throwing mad man, throw a few rocks at him too. So, I chose to throw my own 9 so called principles at Museveni, blow by blow, here on Buganda Post. Mr. Museveni’s “stones” (poor spelling is his) are shown in regular text and my “rocks” in bold.

Guidance on Baganda vs Guidance on Banyoro

Having thought about all this for a long time, I am proposing the following principles to be part of the solutions.

After reading president Museveni’s letter and thinking about it for a short time, I am proposing the following principles to be part of the solutions.

1.     Ring-fencing the LC 5 positions in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indigenous people; and also ring-fencing the sub-county leadership in the whole of Bunyoro.

1. Ring-fencing all politics in the Kingdom of Buganda for native Baganda people (the Bataka and appropriate community leaders will sort out the details of how to put Baluuri, Banyala, Bakenyi and even certain Bajjwa on the path to full recognition as citizens of Buganda, and integrating some of their unique customary practices in Baganda culture)

2.    Ring-fencing the positions of Member of Parliament in the whole of Bunyoro region for the indeginous people except for the special constituencies created around Rutete (Lutete) and Kisita resettlement schemes. Number and two will in the spirit of article of 9 and article 10 of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda. They were also envisaged by article 32 of the constitution of Uganda which talked about affirmative action in favour of marginalized groups by reason of history or otherwise for the purpose of redressing imbalances that exist against them.

2. Abolishing the bogus 1995 Museveni Constitution since it is a “weapon of Buganda occupation”. Over 90% of Buganda’s people publically protested it because they preferred a federal form of government and Mr. Museveni responded with threats  to use force. The same happened in 1998 when Baganda demonstrated against the Land Act; Mr. Museveni threaten to start a new guerrilla war. Even more importantly, our Kabaka has publically stated, “Tuli mu buwambe” (”we under occupation”) – the Kabaka cannot lie!

3.    All the indigenous people that were on the Mailo land in 1964 should be granted ownership and the absentee landlords should leave the land. All the indeginous people that have been on public land should get titles ownership of that land. The Bafuuriki in the settlement schemes already have their land and should get titles if they do not have them. The Bafuuriki who bought land legally should have their rights recognized.

3. All Baganda who, in 1986, were on land that was later acquired irregularly by non-Baganda (using stolen government funds, drug money, laundered funds, land grabbing, etc.) shall be granted ownership and titles. Proof of income and tax records will be required to support claims of legal acquisition by the non-Baganda. Anyone who bought stolen property (abaagula ebibbe) will automatically lose it as required by ancient Buganda Laws.

4.    All the illegal encroachers in forest reserves should be evicted without compensation as the normadic cattle keepers of Buliisa are being settled in Buganda.

4. All the illegal encroachers in forest reserves, wetlands and cultural sites shall  be evicted without compensation and the nomadic cattle keepers will be repatriated to their home countries, using Tanzania’s successful experience as a model.

5.    The towns and trading centre should be exempted from these affirmative action measures. They should be free for all Ugandans. This is the healthy integration. The totally integrated Uganda should have its nucleus in the urban centers, factories, the hotels, the shops, the real estate etc. in oreder to promote healthy integration, industrialization should be promoted to pull redundant population from rural areas to the urban areas. Here there should be no regulation beyond ensuring that the workers are Ugandans.

5. Land ownership by genuine non-Baganda investors and residents will follow international norms, using countries like Japan, Korea and Israel as models. There will be a limit to the amount of land these non-Baganda investors and residents may own outside urban areas – to be set by the Great Lukiiko.

6.    The indigenous people who get land should be prohibited from selling the land for 20years and also leasing it.

6. The indigenous people who get land shall be free to sell their land to other Buganda or to non-Baganda through Buganda Land Board and according to the laws governing Buganda land.

7.    A program of sensitising the Banyoro and Bafuuriki should be promoted.

7. A program of sensitizing all Baganda and residents of Buganda about the historical and cultural importance we put on our land and environment shall be promoted.

8.    Government should have a special program for developing Bunyoro using money provided by the central government including the British funds.

8. Ssabasajja Kabaka’s Government shall have a comprehensive strategy and several programs to develop the kingdom’s people at a rapid rate, relying on the resources of Kabaka’s people all over the world – Kabaka does not “beg”.

9.    Finally there should a sunset clause to terminate or cause a review of this policy after 20years.

9. Finally, there is no sunset clause to terminate or reduce the rights of Baganda to determine how their God given land in the 18 counties shall be administered.

All this is a consequence of the colonial policies also supported by the traditional chiefs like of Mengo in Uganda, of discouraging the use of Swahili as a national language. If the people of Bunyoro-the Banyoro or the Bafuuriki were using Swahili, their differences would be submerged. It is the use of vernacular that provokes, in part, these contradictions. I like the indeginous languages, in fact I am about to complete a dictionary in Runyakore-Rukiga. However, I see these vanaculars not as an end in themselves. I see them as a source of enriching Swahili. That is why NRM promotes Swahili. We included it in the constitution; we use it in the army etc.

The committee, should, therefore, look at the principles I have mentioned above and see them work. You should also identify any other problems that I have not identified and propose solutions. You should propose any solutions you feel are useful in the areas for which I have suggested solutions.

All this  is a consequence of failure on our part, the Baganda,  to recognize that Uganda has needed us way much more than we did. And, that the relationship is now irreparable, especially since Uganda is a certified failed state, run by common thieves. How would one otherwise explain why the president’s office cannot not use an English spell-checker on Mr. Museveni’s letter?

Awangaale Ssabasajja!

Samwiri Mukasa

I was shocked by Charles Onyango Obbo’s decision to ridicule Baganda and, by extension, our Kabaka in his Ear to The Ground column, which will appear in the Monitor newspaper of July 22, 2009. To paraphrase one smart non-Muganda, “A little power is dangerous”. Apparently, Mr. Obbo, a former UPC youth winger, is convinced that his relative popularity and longevity in the Opinion business, empowers him to ridicule a 1,000 year old kingdom. I say, Obbo’s little power is quite dangerous to us Baganda, other residents of Buganda, and even his own family.

In his column entitled, “Here are guerilla tactics for Buganda in its ‘war’” Mr. Obbo first admits that “Uganda will never be able to move forward until the Buganda question is resolved and taken off the table.” Then he proceeds to recommended, mockingly, a list of “clever guerilla tactics Buganda might adopt to win over the majority of Ugandans to its side.” Mr. Obbo tells Kabaka Mutebi and his Baganda to try the following to please and gain the support of other Ugandans: (a) convert the Bika by’Abaganda tournament to a Uganda district level competition, (b) change the Buganda regatta (boating competition) to a Ugandan regatta; (c) similarly, abandon the Buganda wrestling competition (Ekigwo Gombya) in favor of a Uganda version, and (d) start a new game, bull fights where bulls owned by Mr. Museveni would be able to field a team from his ranches.

In Mr. Onyango Obbo’s words, “I suspect most referees will be inclined to blow the whistle in favour of  Kaguta’s bulls. As a man who loves his animals deeply, I suspect this will warm Museveni’s heart to no end and he will look more generously upon Buganda’s representations.” And after condemning Buganda to future to the mercy of Mr. Museveni, Mr. Obbo wields his ‘little power’ to concludes on a serious note that, “Buganda will then discover an old truth; you can never win the game, if you don’t play.”

For years, before I read Charles Onyango Obbo’s latest column, I was a big fan. I learnt to overlook his UPC youth winger past because I believe that people can change. But more, importantly, because I thought that he was a smart person. I think differently now. For, it takes a fool think that this is the time to “kick Buganda in the stomach”, just to get some laughs and dollars. Mr. Obbo, I am no longer a fan and, thanks to you, I have joined those Baganda who would rather be feared, even if not respect me. Please stop attacking my Kabaka and fellow Baganda; keep off Buganda and our Kabaka. We have a saying, “Abaganda busa bwa mbogo!”.

Ssabasajja Kabaka Awangaale!

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Professor Philip Alston, presented his detailed report on Kenya at the recent 11th Session of the UN Human Rights Council.  In an extraordinary week of political maneuvering, reinforcing the internal tension that plagues Kenya’s Grand Coalition Government, the Kenyan delegation responded with an oral statement to the Council that contradicted their earlier written response. Having initially denied Professor Alston’s accusations of the widespread and systematic use of extrajudicial killings by the Kenya Police Force, the delegation conceded that there is a problem, but stopped short of acknowledging Government complicity.

The proceedings and outcomes at the 11th Session have received much local and international press.  Now, two weeks later, the focus must shift to action taken by the Kenyan Government to address the issues raised by Professor Alston and the fall out from the publication of his report, which included the killing of two human rights defenders that had previously cooperated with his mandate.  Despite the eventually positive response from the Kenyan delegation in Geneva, early signs of action are not necessarily promising.

Professor Alston’s report articulated what concerned local and international organisations have been saying about the Kenya Police Force for many years and which the Government failed to acknowledge until their oral statement to the Council – that extrajudicial killings are part of the policing landscape in Kenya. The oral statement also contained a public acknowledgement of Kenya’s weak police oversight mechanisms, the need to establish a local independent police commission and assurances that no human rights defenders would be intimidated or harassed as a result of their cooperation with the UN Special Procedures mandate-holders.

Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the promising outcomes in Geneva will translate into credible action in Nairobi.  Successive promises of reform articulated in a number of strategies and processes over the past 10 years have not been completed or sustained by the Kenya Government.  Kenyans continue to be policed by an organisation that lacks sufficient accountability structures, fails to protect or uphold basic human rights and is continually subject to illegitimate political interference.  Millions of dollars have been invested in the development and publication of commission reports, task force findings and reform strategies without any genuine steps by the Government to implement systemic reform.

The concerning state of policing in Kenya has received significant national and international attention over the past 18 months.  The police response to the 2007 post-election violence brought the issue of political partisanship, impunity and brutality to the fore.  The Waki Commission report into the violence strongly recommended comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police Force and Administration Police and Professor Alston’s report reinforced the brutal and corrupt practices that have been permitted to flourish by the unreformed, colonial policing model. 

Police reform is a daunting and long term process.  It requires substantial law reform, a radical shift in policing culture from one of impunity to accountability and the restoration of trust between police and the community.  None of these urgent reforms will happen in Kenya without the political and financial commitment of the Government to undertake reforms of this scope.  The recent establishment by the President of a special Police Reform Task Force represents a positive step towards delivering credible advances.  However, the Government must translate the Task Force’s recommendations into actual reform that goes beyond improving operational capacity to address governance, accountability and legal structures.  Otherwise the Task Force, for all its good intention, will become another failed reform vehicle.

Drawing on the previous recommendations and those foreshadowed to appear in the current Task Force findings, the Government should implement the following minimum reforms:

• Constitutional and legislative amendments that clearly separate the operational control of the police from the direct control from the political Executive and provide for transparency in monitoring police performance and conduct,
• Strengthening internal and external oversight mechanisms, including the enactment of legislation and budgetary allocation to give full effect to the Police Oversight Board plus the establishment of an independent complaints mechanisms,
• Establish a clear demarcation between the role of the Kenya Police Force and the Administration Police,
• Improve police human rights training and resourcing to strengthen human rights compliance and operational effectiveness in the prevention, detection and investigation of crime, and
• Establish clear legislative guidelines on the use of force, torture and adherence to basic due process that accord with Kenya’s existing obligations under international law.

If the Government is serious about reforming the police, a commitment to implementing past and current recommendations is not enough.  It must also take immediate steps that both demonstrate its firm commitment to reform and restore public confidence in the reform process.  A positive first action should be the investigation, prosecution and punishment of those police officers who commit or acquiesce to illegal acts including, but not limited to, those responsible for the 2007 post-election violence and the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings.

Other immediate steps must include measures to implement the Government’s guarantee of protection to individuals who have been intimidated or subject to retribution for their cooperation with the UN Special Procedures mandate-holders.  Human rights defenders, including members of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights have been subject to threats and some have been forced to flee Kenya.  The high profile execution of two prominent human rights defenders, who cooperated with Professor Alston, and the failure by the police and Government to identify those responsible, highlights the inadequacy of protection and security for human rights defenders.  While Kenya has a witness protection programme, reform is urgently required to ensure the integrity of its internal processes (including accountability, Executive control and information storage and sharing) before those who are most in need of protection will have confidence in the systems that are designed to deliver it. 

The 2007 post-election violence, followed by the findings in Professor Alston’s report, and the tragic consequences for human rights defenders who cooperated with his mandate, have kept the problems with Kenyan policing firmly in the international spotlight.  Whether the political will to commit to genuine reform is present in the Grand Coalition Government remains to be seen, but what is clear to the international community is that the need for police reform is more crucial than ever.

The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) is an independent, non-partisan, international NGO working for the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth.
www.humanrightsinitiative.org

While trying to subdue the indigenous tribes of western Europe, the Generals of the conquering Roman army were often confounded by the resilience of the natives on the battlefield. As a response, they developed the tactic of declaring truces and then sending lavish gifts across the lines to some of the native commanders, while leaving out others. This would sometimes lead to in-fighting among the natives as mutual suspicion developed, which the Romans would then militarily exploit.

The dust kicked up during the controversy over whether or not Buganda should accept the promised 2 billion shillings (of which a down-payment of 350 million was immediately wired) from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, is just beginning to settle. Inside and outside Buganda, there was a strong division of opinion. One kingdom got more than the others that got something. Most got nothing at all. Maybe history was being repeated.

This was understandable. There are many things about the promise that did not make sense, to the extent of obscuring those aspects of it that did.

Questions were raised as to why only three out of Uganda’s numerous officially recognised “cultural institutions” had been selected for this largesse. In addition, why having a “cultural leader” became the basis for being considered for the cash grant. Furthermore, it was unclear why Buganda was offered twice as much as the 1 billion shillings that were promised to Bunyoro and Busoga respectively.

Even more complicated was the central government’s declaration that the money was to go towards “improving agriculture” in the areas concerned. In the wake of the problem Uganda has had with NAADS, as well as the silent death of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), this was truly mystifying: what were to be the actual terms? Was this to be a top-up to the paltry 4.1% of the National Budget that Uganda currently spends of the agricultural sector, or a substitute for it? Was there to be a proportional reduction of the national budget allocation to those districts that fall in the areas slated to receive the grants?  How was the agricultural situation in Buganda deemed to be in twice as much need as the other two Kingdoms, warranting a grant twice as big as the others? And again, what about other areas in the country not eligible for this grant; do they not have the need to improve agriculture?

There are even constitutional interpretation problems, stemming from President Museveni’s previous utterances to the effect that these cultural institutions “don’t exist”, or if they do, it is only as “backward chiefs”, of no importance to the national development agenda. To whom then, is his government now handing over significant amounts of public money?

What we are in fact witnessing has very little to do with beans and fertiliser as such, and is in fact simply a further development in the twists and turns of a very protracted and troubled negotiation process (or should one say power struggle?) between Buganda and the very NRM that it helped bring to power.

For the last 16 years, the NRM government has been desperately trying to extricate itself from the huge political setback it suffered when Ganda post-war militancy forced it to hurriedly design and pass the Traditional Rulers (Restitution) Assets and Properties Bill of 1993 (popularly known as Ebyaffe Bill) into law. This Act commits the state to recognising the existence of Buganda -as well as other such entities, but more critically, it re-introduces into law the principle that Buganda’s has a right to the property seized from her in 1967. This is the crux of the matter: the central government is legally obliged to hand over valuable and significant amounts of the real estate to a rival political centre. No central government will ever do this willingly, as it undermines their own power, and overturns the entire logic behind the efforts of Frederick Lugard, Governor Cohen and finally Milton Obote in destroying native identity so as to build the Uganda state.

The fact that the NRM went so far as to return native identity to a legal footing (something that even Idi Amin managed to dodge way back in 1972) shows the extent of their opportunism borne of a hunger for power. The fact that they now seek to dodge laws they themselves made about it, shows just how desperate that opportunism has made them.

This a problem that cannot be solved, and will contribute significantly to the approaching fall of the NRM  regime, just as the British, Obote and Amin regimes came and were seen off by the natives they found in place.

This current handout therefore reminds one of the situations of a thief trying to flee with his loot while being pursued by an angry mob, and so keeps throwing part of the stolen goods over his shoulder in a bid to slow them down.

This puts the actual owners of the stolen goods in a dilemma: do they leave the dropped goods to the mob and keep on after the thief, or do they try to first rescue what has been dropped also, and then continue the chase?

This is exactly where the matter has been stuck for 16 years: Buganda and Uganda have not been able to establish and follow a clear negotiation process, as called for by the Ebyaffe Act. The problem is that the central government/NRM never really expected these “damn natives” to still be asserting their identity after this long, and so never imagined they would be expected to actually start handing over property. We have therefore seen President Museveni buying time by keeping proceedings vague and only making concessions if he thinks he will gain from them in the political short term. This is actually standard NRM procedure when faced with a determined opponent: buy time with “negotiations”, while frantically working behind the scenes to change the material facts of the very issue under discussion. If you have to actually make a real concession, you then try to portray it as an act of goodwill on your part, that demonstrates how serious you are with the talks. So while then Katikkiro Joseph Mulwanyamuli’s team engaged in nearly 11 years of diplomatic “heavy lifting”, the NRM began making fundamental legal and demographic changes to the very land and properties that are under the said negotiations. Examples of this are: donating Buganda’s land to “investors”; bringing non-Baganda newcomers as settlers to these areas; introducing decentralisation thereby creating new districts whose “land boards” then claim and sell Buganda’s land; using the 1995 constitution-making process to “constitutionally” remove Kampala from Buganda and most recently, creating new “Kingdoms” within Buganda.

The purpose is to ensure that by the time NRM sits down to serious conclusive talks with Buganda, there is actually nothing left physically to talk about. This is what Mengo has worked out and explains their growing anger. Ugandans have seen this before. This is exactly how the NRM/A prevaricated for six months during the 1985 Nairobi Peace Talks, so that by the time they reached an “Agreement” with the Okello Junta, they had changed themselves from a beaten and retreating army of barely 4,000 soldiers to a British-sponsored mercenary force of 40,000, and promptly stormed Kampala. Similarly, for over a decade, the NRM continually put off the day when the country would return to multi-partyism, so that by the time it did, all the key national policy issues, particularly around macroeconomic policy, were already cast in stone, leaving the new opposition with little of real substance to debate in parliament.

Today, the living conditions for people inside and outside Buganda remain dire. As a result, it is hard for any leader to continue rejecting offers of cash – however unprincipled the offer – while being unable to deliver alternatives to that same population, even though the one offering the cash is the same person creating the obstacles to better living.

Therefore, despite all the NRM time-buying manoeuvres, as well as rent arrears totalling 900 billion shillings, the Katikkiro of Buganda has found himself being the defender of the idea of receiving a gift of money from somebody who is legally in debt to him by a much larger amount.

The NRM also hopes for a few “side-benefits” from this cash grant. First, is the anticipated bolstering of the notion that “once again”, Buganda was being “favoured” over other equally deserving Ugandans by a central government, thus building greater resentment of Baganda by other Ugandans. Second was the expectation that it would create irreconcilable divisions among the many hundreds of activists and campaigners who work for Buganda on a voluntary basis, and are therefore not impressed by the argument that without money, no progress can be made. The third anticipated “side-benefit”, would be to make some southerners and westerners as a whole to welcome being favoured over northerners and easterners (who only got elastic pangas and rotting beans to help them recover from the wars and floods), thereby encouraging them to see the NRM as their friend and benefactor. After all, the 2011 elections are nearly here.

Most importantly, there is the hope and intention of the NRM to revive the Regional Tier proposal. A further probable incentive here is the rumoured discovery of precious minerals, including oil, in one of the exploration blocs located in Buganda. The NRM is perhaps now keen to lock the Kingdom into a clear resource-controlling constitutional arrangement such as the regional tier, well before the discovery is announced. After all the problems Buganda has caused them over just land, perhaps the NRM  leaders are now losing sleep at the prospect of having to negotiate oil matters with Mengo.

Buganda insists that this grant will not sway her from pursuing her wider objectives. It could well be a case of the Luganda proverb: “Nyama ntono, okayana ekuli mu nkwaawa” (roughly translated: before complaining about the smallness of the meat you have been given, first make sure it is firmly in your grasp). Certainly, more than a few harsh words were exchanged among Baganda activists, but this has only served to highlight the importance of recognising success. Those critical of this grant tend to be those campaigners, such as the redoubtable Betty Nambooze, who have galvanised Ganda public opinion through ably articulating a firm and uncompromising line in favour of federation, should actually be credited with creating the pressure that has forced the NRM  into such manoeuvring in the first place.

We are probably just at the beginning of this NRM generosity. Cash has been promised for the renovation of Kingdom properties, as well as clearing some rent arrears. It is important therefore that all the important stakeholders: people from outside Buganda who are watching in amazement; the activists who recognise an attempted bribe when they see one; and the leaders of Buganda government business to recognise that these manoeuvres will end up strengthening Mengo, not dividing her.

END