By Kalundi Serumaga
kalundi@yahoo.com
While trying to subdue the indigenous tribes of western Europe, the Generals of the conquering Roman army were often confounded by the resilience of the natives on the battlefield. As a response, they developed the tactic of declaring truces and then sending lavish gifts across the lines to some of the native commanders, while leaving out others. This would sometimes lead to in-fighting among the natives as mutual suspicion developed, which the Romans would then militarily exploit.
The dust kicked up during the controversy over whether or not Buganda should accept the promised 2 billion shillings (of which a down-payment of 350 million was immediately wired) from the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, is just beginning to settle. Inside and outside Buganda, there was a strong division of opinion. One kingdom got more than the others that got something. Most got nothing at all. Maybe history was being repeated.
This was understandable. There are many things about the promise that did not make sense, to the extent of obscuring those aspects of it that did.
Questions were raised as to why only three out of Uganda’s numerous officially recognised “cultural institutions” had been selected for this largesse. In addition, why having a “cultural leader” became the basis for being considered for the cash grant. Furthermore, it was unclear why Buganda was offered twice as much as the 1 billion shillings that were promised to Bunyoro and Busoga respectively.
Even more complicated was the central government’s declaration that the money was to go towards “improving agriculture” in the areas concerned. In the wake of the problem Uganda has had with NAADS, as well as the silent death of the Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), this was truly mystifying: what were to be the actual terms? Was this to be a top-up to the paltry 4.1% of the National Budget that Uganda currently spends of the agricultural sector, or a substitute for it? Was there to be a proportional reduction of the national budget allocation to those districts that fall in the areas slated to receive the grants? How was the agricultural situation in Buganda deemed to be in twice as much need as the other two Kingdoms, warranting a grant twice as big as the others? And again, what about other areas in the country not eligible for this grant; do they not have the need to improve agriculture?
There are even constitutional interpretation problems, stemming from President Museveni’s previous utterances to the effect that these cultural institutions “don’t exist”, or if they do, it is only as “backward chiefs”, of no importance to the national development agenda. To whom then, is his government now handing over significant amounts of public money?
What we are in fact witnessing has very little to do with beans and fertiliser as such, and is in fact simply a further development in the twists and turns of a very protracted and troubled negotiation process (or should one say power struggle?) between Buganda and the very NRM that it helped bring to power.
For the last 16 years, the NRM government has been desperately trying to extricate itself from the huge political setback it suffered when Ganda post-war militancy forced it to hurriedly design and pass the Traditional Rulers (Restitution) Assets and Properties Bill of 1993 (popularly known as Ebyaffe Bill) into law. This Act commits the state to recognising the existence of Buganda -as well as other such entities, but more critically, it re-introduces into law the principle that Buganda’s has a right to the property seized from her in 1967. This is the crux of the matter: the central government is legally obliged to hand over valuable and significant amounts of the real estate to a rival political centre. No central government will ever do this willingly, as it undermines their own power, and overturns the entire logic behind the efforts of Frederick Lugard, Governor Cohen and finally Milton Obote in destroying native identity so as to build the Uganda state.
The fact that the NRM went so far as to return native identity to a legal footing (something that even Idi Amin managed to dodge way back in 1972) shows the extent of their opportunism borne of a hunger for power. The fact that they now seek to dodge laws they themselves made about it, shows just how desperate that opportunism has made them.
This a problem that cannot be solved, and will contribute significantly to the approaching fall of the NRM regime, just as the British, Obote and Amin regimes came and were seen off by the natives they found in place.
This current handout therefore reminds one of the situations of a thief trying to flee with his loot while being pursued by an angry mob, and so keeps throwing part of the stolen goods over his shoulder in a bid to slow them down.
This puts the actual owners of the stolen goods in a dilemma: do they leave the dropped goods to the mob and keep on after the thief, or do they try to first rescue what has been dropped also, and then continue the chase?
This is exactly where the matter has been stuck for 16 years: Buganda and Uganda have not been able to establish and follow a clear negotiation process, as called for by the Ebyaffe Act. The problem is that the central government/NRM never really expected these “damn natives” to still be asserting their identity after this long, and so never imagined they would be expected to actually start handing over property. We have therefore seen President Museveni buying time by keeping proceedings vague and only making concessions if he thinks he will gain from them in the political short term. This is actually standard NRM procedure when faced with a determined opponent: buy time with “negotiations”, while frantically working behind the scenes to change the material facts of the very issue under discussion. If you have to actually make a real concession, you then try to portray it as an act of goodwill on your part, that demonstrates how serious you are with the talks. So while then Katikkiro Joseph Mulwanyamuli’s team engaged in nearly 11 years of diplomatic “heavy lifting”, the NRM began making fundamental legal and demographic changes to the very land and properties that are under the said negotiations. Examples of this are: donating Buganda’s land to “investors”; bringing non-Baganda newcomers as settlers to these areas; introducing decentralisation thereby creating new districts whose “land boards” then claim and sell Buganda’s land; using the 1995 constitution-making process to “constitutionally” remove Kampala from Buganda and most recently, creating new “Kingdoms” within Buganda.
The purpose is to ensure that by the time NRM sits down to serious conclusive talks with Buganda, there is actually nothing left physically to talk about. This is what Mengo has worked out and explains their growing anger. Ugandans have seen this before. This is exactly how the NRM/A prevaricated for six months during the 1985 Nairobi Peace Talks, so that by the time they reached an “Agreement” with the Okello Junta, they had changed themselves from a beaten and retreating army of barely 4,000 soldiers to a British-sponsored mercenary force of 40,000, and promptly stormed Kampala. Similarly, for over a decade, the NRM continually put off the day when the country would return to multi-partyism, so that by the time it did, all the key national policy issues, particularly around macroeconomic policy, were already cast in stone, leaving the new opposition with little of real substance to debate in parliament.
Today, the living conditions for people inside and outside Buganda remain dire. As a result, it is hard for any leader to continue rejecting offers of cash – however unprincipled the offer – while being unable to deliver alternatives to that same population, even though the one offering the cash is the same person creating the obstacles to better living.
Therefore, despite all the NRM time-buying manoeuvres, as well as rent arrears totalling 900 billion shillings, the Katikkiro of Buganda has found himself being the defender of the idea of receiving a gift of money from somebody who is legally in debt to him by a much larger amount.
The NRM also hopes for a few “side-benefits” from this cash grant. First, is the anticipated bolstering of the notion that “once again”, Buganda was being “favoured” over other equally deserving Ugandans by a central government, thus building greater resentment of Baganda by other Ugandans. Second was the expectation that it would create irreconcilable divisions among the many hundreds of activists and campaigners who work for Buganda on a voluntary basis, and are therefore not impressed by the argument that without money, no progress can be made. The third anticipated “side-benefit”, would be to make some southerners and westerners as a whole to welcome being favoured over northerners and easterners (who only got elastic pangas and rotting beans to help them recover from the wars and floods), thereby encouraging them to see the NRM as their friend and benefactor. After all, the 2011 elections are nearly here.
Most importantly, there is the hope and intention of the NRM to revive the Regional Tier proposal. A further probable incentive here is the rumoured discovery of precious minerals, including oil, in one of the exploration blocs located in Buganda. The NRM is perhaps now keen to lock the Kingdom into a clear resource-controlling constitutional arrangement such as the regional tier, well before the discovery is announced. After all the problems Buganda has caused them over just land, perhaps the NRM leaders are now losing sleep at the prospect of having to negotiate oil matters with Mengo.
Buganda insists that this grant will not sway her from pursuing her wider objectives. It could well be a case of the Luganda proverb: “Nyama ntono, okayana ekuli mu nkwaawa” (roughly translated: before complaining about the smallness of the meat you have been given, first make sure it is firmly in your grasp). Certainly, more than a few harsh words were exchanged among Baganda activists, but this has only served to highlight the importance of recognising success. Those critical of this grant tend to be those campaigners, such as the redoubtable Betty Nambooze, who have galvanised Ganda public opinion through ably articulating a firm and uncompromising line in favour of federation, should actually be credited with creating the pressure that has forced the NRM into such manoeuvring in the first place.
We are probably just at the beginning of this NRM generosity. Cash has been promised for the renovation of Kingdom properties, as well as clearing some rent arrears. It is important therefore that all the important stakeholders: people from outside Buganda who are watching in amazement; the activists who recognise an attempted bribe when they see one; and the leaders of Buganda government business to recognise that these manoeuvres will end up strengthening Mengo, not dividing her.
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